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Abstract. Machine learning models, especially based on deep architec-
tures are used in everyday applications ranging from self driving cars to
medical diagnostics. It has been shown that such models are dangerously
susceptible to adversarial samples, indistinguishable from real samples
to human eye, adversarial samples lead to incorrect classifications with
high confidence. Impact of adversarial samples is far-reaching and their
efficient detection remains an open problem. We propose to use direct
density ratio estimation as an efficient model agnostic measure to de-
tect adversarial samples. Our proposed method works equally well with
single and multi-channel samples, and with different adversarial sample
generation methods. We also propose a method to use density ratio es-
timates for generating adversarial samples with an added constraint of
preserving density ratio.
1 Introduction
Self driving cars [1], robotics [14], computer games [18], imaging [4] and speech
[24] are just some of the domains where deep learning has established state-of-
the-art results and is being used in day to day applications. Recently [6] it has
been established that such models can be easily fooled to misclassify with high
probability using systematically perturbed inputs known as adversarial samples,
which are visually imperceptible perturbations to real data. Existence of adver-
sarial samples in real world poses a grave threat. Take an example of a self driving
car, that uses a trained machine learning model to distinguish between different
traffic signs. An adversarial sample can trick the model to classify stop sign as a
yield sign [21], resulting in disastrous consequences. Figure 1 shows two such ex-
amples, where models are tricked to incorrectly classify avdersarially generated
images that are otherwise indistinguishable to human eyes from original images.
Crafting effective defenses against adversarial samples is an important research
problem and an active research area. However, effective solutions remain elusive
due to the limited understanding of the nature of adversarial samples.
Adversarial samples, irrespective of the generative process, are perturbations
to the original data. Assuming all data is generated from some underlying prob-
ability distribution admitting certain probability density, adversarial perturba-
tions result in perturbed probability density regions. Our proposed method takes
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Fig. 1: Examples of adversarially generated images, (a) and (b) are from Good-
fellow et al. [6] where (a) is the original image classified correctly as ”panda”
by the model and (b) is adversarially perturbed image, classified as ”gibbon”.
Images (c) and (d) are from Papernot et al. [21] where (c) is the image of a
stop sign correctly classified as a ”stop sign” and (d) is adversarially perturbed
image, classified as ”yield” by the same model.
advantage the fact that we are able to detect such perturbations with high con-
fidence. We propose to use direct density ratio estimation [?] as an intuitive,
simple and model agnostic approach to effectively distinguish adversarial sam-
ples from real samples. To summarize, we make the following contributions:
1. We present the first study proposing density ratio estimates as an efficient
and model agnostic method for detecting adversarial samples.
2. We show that adversarial detection based on density ratio estimates works
for single and multi-channel samples alike (such as grayscale and colored
images) and is transferable, that is, it works for different adversarial sample
generation methods without the need of being trained for a specific one.
3. We study the effective sample size required to estimate density ratio esti-
mates so as to detect adversarial samples with high confidence in real life
scenarios.
4. We propose a modification to adversarial sample generation process by in-
corporating density ratio estimates, to generate adversarial samples that are
closer to original samples with respect to their probability densities.
Rest of the paper is organized as following: Next section presents prelimi-
nary introduction to direct density ratio estimation and methods for adversarial
sample generation, followed by the section 3 presenting insights to how and why
density ratio estimation works for detecting adversarial samples. In section 4 we
present empirical evaluation of our proposed method on MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets followed by our proposed adversarial sample generation method in sec-
tion 5, related work in section 6 and finally we conclude the paper in section
7.
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2 Preliminaries
This section gives preliminary introduction to direct density ratio estimation
method and methods for generating adversarial samples.
2.1 Density ratio estimation
Comparing probability distributions is a primary task in statistical learning. One
of the principled way of comparing two distributions pa(x), pb(x), from datasets
a, b, or the divergence between distributions is by estimating the density ratio:
r(x) =
pa(x)
pb(x)
(1)
A naive way of calculating r(x) would be to explicitly estimate pa(x) and pb(x),
and plug the estimates in (1). But, direct density estimation is known to be
a hard task [25]. This is easily overcome by directly estimating r(x), without
having to estimate pa(x) and pb(x) separately [8,19]. Different methods can be
used to approximate r(x), but in this paper we use the efficient unconstrained
least squares importance fitting with cross-validation, details of which can be
found in [8].
2.2 Adversarial image generation
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) for generating adversarial samples was in-
troduced by Goodfellow et al. [6]. Given a model’s cost function c(M,x, y),
adversarial sample is generated as x∗ = x+ σx, where σx is computed as
σx =  sign(∇xc(M,x, y)) (2)
where sign(∇xc(M,x, y) is the sign of model’s cost function gradient.  controls
the amount of perturbation, larger values of  create highly perturbed images,
distinguishable from real images by humans.
Jacobian Based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) introduced by Papernot et
al. [22] chooses perturbations by iteratively modifying only a limited number
of features chosen based on decreasing adversarial saliency value where saliency
values are calculated using model’s Jacobian matrix.
Target Gradient Sign Methods (TGSM) works to create perturbations in a
way so as to push the misclassifications towards a specific class [11].
We refer readers to excellent works of Papernot et al. [21] and Kurakin et al.
[11] for further details.
3 Density ratio estimation for detecting adversarial
samples
This section explains why density ratio estimation is a good choice for detecting
adversarial samples and how it is used in such scenarios.
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3.1 Intuition
All data are assumed to be generated from an underlying probability distribution
with a certain probability density, approximable by a random sample. Creating
adversarial samples involves perturbing original data in a systematic way. These
perturbations lead to perturbed density regions, detected by direct density ratio
estimation. Figure 2 explicitly shows this phenomenon, where we used tSNE
[17] to plot original and FGSM created adversarial MNIST [13] and grayscaled
CIFAR-10 [10] images from their respective test partitions. We can clearly see
the original images occupying certain density regions, which are very different
from their adversarially generated counterparts.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2: tSNE plots for MNIST and grayscaled CIFAR-10 test datasets and their
adversarial counterparts generated using FGSM with  = 0.3. (a) is MNIST, real
data; (b) is MNIST, adversarial data; (c) is CIFAR-10 grayscale, real data and
(d) is it’s adversarial version. It is clear that densities of real and adversarial
data differ significantly.
3.2 Detection
We start with a simple example, where we only have real images. That is, our
dataset does not have any adversarial images. We begin by drawing two random
samples of sufficiently large size from the dataset. For now, sufficiently large can
be assumed to be n = 100, and lets denote the two random samples by X1 and
X2. Using unconstrained least squared approach, we estimate the density ratio
of X1 and X2 as
R(X) =
p(X1)
p(X2)
(3)
where p(X1) and p(X2) are probability densities of X1 and X2 respectively. If
X1 and X2 are from the same underlying probability distribution, we can see
that R(X) would be approximated to be closer to 1. And, if the samples are
from different distributions, the ratio would be farther away from 1. As should
be the case with adversarial samples, which indeed is true as we show in later
sections.
Readers might wonder: What if the images are colored? as this is the case
in most real life scenarios. As a solution, we can simply extend our proposed
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method to estimate density ratio per color channel. In addition, we also define
a density ratio estimate on the average of all three density ratio estimates of
individual color channels, given as
R(Xa) =
1
3
(p(Xr1 )
p(Xr2 )
+
p(Xg1 )
p(Xg2 )
+
p(Xb1)
p(Xb2)
)
(4)
where Xr, Xg, Xb are red, green and blue channels respectively. The combined
estimate can be used as a single statistic per comparison instead of using per
channel individual estimates if required.
4 Evaluation
This section presents empirical evaluation of our proposed method on colored
and grayscale images with varying sample sizes and with varying adversarial
sample generating methods.
4.1 Experimental setup
FGSM adversarial samples are generated using Cleverhans [20], JSMA and
TGSM samples are generated using Keras [3] and TensorFlow 1. Datasets MNIST
[12] and CIFAR-10 [9] are the primary datasets used in this study, CIFAR-10 is
used twice, once in its original form and second time in its grayscaled version.
Test partitions of both datasets are used to generate adversarial samples. We
define our setup for comparison using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Density ratio based adversarial sample detection
Require: X and Y as datasets with real and adversarial samples with n samples in
each.
for i← 1 to t do
a: Sample a random index of length m without replacement from n
b: Sample a random index of length m without replacement from n
x: Sample from real data using index a = X[a, ]
y: Sample from adversarial data using index b = Y [b, ]
z: Sample from real data using index b = X[b, ]
Estimate density ratio R1 =
p(x)
p(y)
Estimate density ratio R2 =
p(x)
p(z)
end for
To detect adversarial samples using density ratio estimation, we expect R1 to be
very different from R2, where R2 would be closer to 1. For initial comparisons, we
1 Code adapted from: https://github.com/gongzhitaao/tensorflow-adversarial
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keep m and t fixed at 100. That is, the experiments are run 100 times with sam-
ple size of 100 in the numerator and the denominator. Results are reported using
mean R1 and R2 with related 95% confidence intervals for statistical precision
and comparison.
4.2 Primary results
We start with the standard evaluation on MNIST, grayscale version of CIFAR-
10 and colored CIFAR-10 with adversarial samples generated using FGSM with
varying values of . Table 1 shows the results, it is clear that real-real den-
Table 1: Density ratio estimates of real-adversarial and real-real samples. Real-
real estimates are much closer to 1, as they should be compared to real-
adversarial estimates. Average real-adversarial density estimates for all values
of  are significantly different from real-real estimates using mean comparison
with α ≤ 0.05.

Real
Adversarial
Real
Real
MNIST
0.1 1.83(1.75,1.91) 1.32(1.23,1.41)
0.3 20.70(20.43,20.96) 1.30 (1.21,1.39)
0.5 33.43(32.92,33.95) 1.32(1.23,1.41)
1 34.15(33.60,34.70) 1.30(1.21,1.39)
CIFAR-10(Grayscale)
0.1 1.37 (1.27,1.47) 1.02 (0.99,1.04)
0.3 30.21 (29.43,30.99) 0.99(0.99,1.0)
0.5 52.03 (50.28,53.78) 1.00 (0.99,1.0)
1 51.28(49.8,52.7) 1.01(0.99,1.03)
CIFAR-10(Red)
0.1 2.15(2.09,2.21) 0.99(0.99,1.0)
0.3 30.28(29.58,30.99) 1.00(0.98,1.02)
0.5 41.73(40.49,42.97) 1.02(0.99,1.05)
1 41.76(40.43,43.0) 1.00(0.99,1.00)
CIFAR-10(Green)
0.1 1.90(1.80,2.0) 1.00(0.99,1.00)
0.3 28.52(27.85,29.20) 1.00(0.99,1.00)
0.5 45.65(44.27,47.04) 1.00(0.99,1.01)
1 45.68(44.35,47.00) 1.00(0.99,1.01)
CIFAR-10(Blue)
0.1 1.66(1.54,1.77) 1.00(0.98,1.03)
0.3 19.07(17.90,20.25) 1.01(0.98,1.05)
0.5 38.0(36.86,39.13) 1.04(1.0,1.09)
1 36.59(35.48,37.70) 1.03(0.99,1.06)
CIFAR-10(Combined)
0.1 1.90(1.84,1.96) 1.00(0.99,1.01)
0.3 25.96(25.21,26.71) 1.00(0.99,1.02)
0.5 41.79(40.99,42.59) 1.02(1.00,1.04)
1 41.34(40.52,42.16) 1.00(0.99,1.02)
sity ratios are closer to 1, as we would expect them to be, compared to real-
adversarial estimates. It is also seen that as value of  increases, the density
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ratio for real-adversarial samples deteriorates dramatically. Statistical tests for
comparing means can be used to easily generate hypothesis and produce p-values
for comparisons. In this scenario, all comparisons are statistically significantly
different.
4.3 Varying sample size
Previously, we compared the density ratio estimates using a fixed sample size of
100 for real and adversarial images. In real life scenarios, we usually do not have
100 adversarial samples to estimate density ratio. So, to answer the question of
how many samples are needed to reliably estimate density ratio and to reject
adversarial samples with confidence. We use MNIST and CIFAR-10 (colored) to
run density ratio estimations, but with varying sample sizes from 80 to 10, both
for real and adversarial samples. That is, we simultaneously decrease sample size
in the numerator and the denominator when estimating density ratios. We also
decrease the noise parameter, , to 0.1. Thus, creating adversarial samples that
are closer to real samples and harder to detect.
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Fig. 3: Density ratio estimates by varying sample size with epsilon=0.1, real-real
(RR) density ratio is represented by red line and real-adversarial (RA) density
ratio estimates are represented by blue line. (a) is MNIST, (b) is CIFAR red
channel, (c) is CIFAR green channel, and (d) is CIFAR blue channel. It is seen
that the density ratio estimates deteriorate with decreasing sample size, but a
statistically significant difference persists between real-real and real-adversarial
estimates.
Figure 3 shows the results, it is seen that density ratio estimates deteriorate as
sample size decreases, there is a noticeable shift from the starting sample size
of 80 going to 10. But the difference between real and adversarial density ratio
estimates persist, irrespective of number of samples. Using as few as 10 samples
in the numerator and the denominator, it is possible to distinguish adversarial
samples from real ones with high confidence.
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4.4 Transferability
A significant implicit advantage of using density ratio estimates for the detection
of adversarial samples is the tranferability. As real-real estimates are stationary
within a sample, we can use the proposed method to detect adversarial samples
generated using various different methods. Here, we generate adversarial samples
using JSMA and TGSM. For detection, we use a fixed sample size of 100 and
the comparison strategy described in section 4.1.
Table 2: Density ratio estimates of real-adversarial and real-real samples using
dataset MNIST and colored CIFAR-10 with adversarial samples generated using
JSMA and TGSM methods. It is seen that density ratio estimates are capable
of detecting adversarial samples irrespective of adversarial sample generation
process. Average real-adversarial density estimates for all values are significantly
different from real-real estimates using mean comparison with α ≤ 0.05.

Real
Adversarial
Real
Real
MNIST-JSMA 2.34(2.28,2.40) 1.10(1.01,1.16)
CIFAR-10-Red-JSMA 2.83(2.63,3.04) 1.00(0.98,1.02)
CIFAR-10-Green-JSMA 2.27(2.23,2.30) 1.00(0.99,1.01)
CIFAR-10-Blue-JSMA 2.25(2.14,2.35) 1.03(0.99,1.07)
CIFAR-10-Combined-JSMA 2.45(2.37,2.53) 1.01(1.00,1.03)
MNIST-TGSM 0.1 12.84(11.74,13.93) 1.06(1.01,1.11)
MNIST-TGSM 0.05 6.87(6.80,6.95) 1.09(1.04,1.15)
CIFAR-10-Red-TGSM 0.05 9.07(8.74,9.71) 1.03(0.99,1.06)
CIFAR-10-Green-TGSM 0.05 11.62(10.80,12.43) 1.02(0.99,1.05)
CIFAR-10-Blue-TGSM 0.05 9.34(8.85,9.83) 1.03(0.99,1.07)
CIFAR-10-Combined-TGSM 0.05 10.00(9.65,10.37) 1.03(1.01,1.05)
Table 2 shows the results. It is seen that irrespective of adversarial sample gen-
eration process, adversarial samples have perturbed densities, making density
ratio estimates an ideal candidate for detection with high confidence.
4.5 A real life scenario
So far we have demonstrated the capability of density ratio estimates for de-
tecting adversarial samples with decreasing sample size in numerator and the
denominator. In real life scenarios however, we always have enough supply of
real images with constraints on availability of adversarial samples. Hence, here
we investigate the effectiveness of using density ratio estimates to detect adver-
sarial samples by only varying the sample size of adversarial images. As we have
already shown the utility of our proposed method with sample size as small as
10, here we reduce the sample size for adversarial images even further, keeping
the sample size for real images fixed at 100. This can be implemented as a slight
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modification to Algorithm 1, where we change the length of random index b keep-
ing a fixed at 100. As the results are similar on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets
with different adversarial sample generation methods, here we only concentrate
on samples generated using FGSM on MNIST data.
Table 3: Density ratio estimates of real-adversarial and real-real samples using
dataset MNIST and FGSM created adversarial samples with varying adversarial
sample size,m, and keeping sample size for real images fixed at 100. It is seen that
even a single adversarial example can be detected using density ratio estimation
with FGSM perturbation of  = 0.3.
(m)
Real
Adversarial
Real
Real
MNIST-FGSM
9 19.24(18.24,20.25) 1.55(1.43,1.66)
8 19.84(18.84,20.84) 1.77(1.57,1.97)
7 20.40(19.29,21.51) 1.99(1.66,2.33)
6 19.46(18.33,20.59) 1.79(1.60,1.98)
5 18.90(17.68,20.11) 1.87(1.63,2.11)
4 17.53(16.22,18.85) 1.80(1.54,2.05)
3 17.59(16.14,19.03) 2.15(1.57,2.73)
2 19.90(18.53,21.26) 2.42(1.93,2.90)
1 22.16(20.92,23.43) 6.48(5.18,7.77)
We vary the sample size, m, of adversarial images from 9 to 1. That is, in a
given density ratio estimation, we have 100 real samples with density p(x) and
m adversarial samples with density p(y). We also use m real samples with den-
sity p(z) for comparison of averaged R1 and R2. Table 3 shows the results with
adversarially created samples with  = 0.3. It is seen that density ratio esti-
mates are capable of detecting adversarial samples even when there is only one
adversarial sample under investigation.
5 Crafting adversarial samples using density ratio
estimates
We have demonstrated the capability of density ratio estimates to detect adver-
sarial samples. In this section we study how we can leverage the density ratio
estimates for crafting adversarial samples that explicitly preserve density ratio,
while implicitly preserving probability density of original data. We initiate the
sample crafting using the FGSM method, where we choose the epsilon based
on the difference of density ratio estimates of real-real and real-adversarial sam-
ples. We define a tolerance parameter τ which is the desired/tolerated difference
between real-real and real-adversarial density ratio estimates. Smaller τ means
more similar probability densities. Process of finding optimal epsilon that satis-
fies our tolerance parameter is described in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Crafting adversarial samples using density ratio estimates
Require: X as a dataset with real samples with n observations; initial  = i, tolerance
τ = τ ′, step size for : ∆
while τ > τ ′ do
n = i − ∆
 = n
Generate adversarial batch with FGSM()
for i← 1 to t do
a: Sample a random index of length m without replacement from n
b: Sample a random index of length m without replacement from n
x: Sample from real data using index a = X[a, ]
y: Sample from adversarial data using index b = Y [b, ]
z: Sample from real data using index b = X[b, ]
Estimate density ratio R1 =
p(x)
p(y)
Estimate density ratio R2 =
p(x)
p(z)
end for
Mean(R1)=R1a
Mean(R2)=R2a
τ = |R1a −R2a|
end while
Fig. 4: Tolerance and epsilon,accuracy trade-off. Tolerance is on x-axis, smaller
tolerance means more closer probability densities of real and adversarial samples.
It is seen as the tolerance decreases, epsilon decreases and accuracy of the model
increases, but not by a significant margin.
Figure 2 shows the trade-off of choosing tolerance parameter with respect to
epsilon and classification accuracy. It is seen that as the tolerance is decreased,
that is, adversarial and real samples are more closer with respect to density ratio
estimates, value of epsilon decreases. It makes sense as lower epsilon means less
perturbation. However, even decreasing the value of epsilon to be small enough
so that the tolerance is 0.05 still yields effective adversarial samples, successful
to fool the model without much increase in model’s classification accuracy.
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6 Related work
Crafting effective defences against adversarial attacks is an active area of re-
search. Several defences against adversarial attacks have been proposed, such
as defensive distillation [23] and training models using adversarial examples [6].
But they are generally computationally intensive and model specific, not ag-
nostic [21], similar to some other methods based on game theory [16,2]. Very
recently, some interesting work has been done on adversarial sample detection,
with Feinman et al. [5] working on detection of adversarial samples from arti-
facts, Li et al. [15] using outputs from convolutional layers to detect adversarial
samples and Grosse et al. [7] investigating the statistical detection of adversarial
examples. Our work is closer to [7] where we both propose model agnostic adver-
sarial sample detection methods. However, our methods are primarily different,
ours is based on direct density ratio estimation compared to maximum mean
discrepancy and we provide detailed insight to densities of adversarial samples
with the utility of our method on multi-channel inputs.
7 Conclusion
We have presented the evidence that adversarial samples have perturbed proba-
bility densities compared to real samples and it is possible to detect adversarial
samples with high confidence using density ratio estimates. We have shown that
density ratio estimates work well with single and multi-channel inputs, are capa-
ble of detecting adversarial samples generated using different methods, and with
varying sample sizes. We have also presented a modification to the adversarial
sample generation process, whereby incorporating density ratio estimate as a
constraint, generating samples that are similar to original samples, not only in
perception, but also with respect to probability densities.
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